New York Times, April 2, 1950

 

Stone Age Brain is the blog of Rick Shenkman, the founding editor of the History News Network. His newest book is Political Animals: How Our Stone-Age Brain Gets in the Way of Smart Politics (Basic Books, 2016). You can follow him on Twitter @rickshenkman.

 

The Republican Party, unsurprisingly, has taken the position that President Trump should be defended. This is unsurprising because this is what parties in power do.  If we want to explain what has happened to the Republican Party, which all must try to do in this hour of crisis when democracy itself is on the line owing to Republican perfidy, it is essential for us to view events not from the perspective of the rational actor but from that of the party politician.  Only then can the alarming events through which we are living become understandable. 

 

We must begin with the basics.  Three overriding causes may be said to account for the behavior of politicians holding national office.  One, is money, with which we need not concern ourselves too much.  It’s obvious the role money plays in our politics.  Members of Congress must always be thinking in the back of their mind how any vote may affect their chance of financing their next election. Every GOP member of Congress has to worry that if they vote against Trump they’ll be cut-off from various campaign funds available to Republicans in good standing with the party and the party’s major-domo donors such as Sheldon Adelson and Charles Koch. 

 

More interesting, though also obvious, is the second factor, pure partisanship. The social sciences tell us that partisanship is hard-wired in the human brain.  It is the reason we cheer for our side in a ball game and hope for the opposition’s defeat.  Once we identify with a group we look for evidence that confirms the group’s status and dismiss evidence that detracts from it.  Because partisanship is stronger among Republicans generally than it is among Democrats, perhaps owing to a default loyalty bias among people who identify as conservative, it is pretty easy to comprehend the ordinary Republican’s behavior in ordinary times.  

 

Of course, these are not ordinary times.  Presidents are rarely impeached.  So Judiciary Committee Chairman Jerry Nadler, ahead of the committee’s vote on impeachment, issued a rare plea that his Republican colleagues consult their consciences before voting.  As many have noted Republicans during Watergate did just this, voting against Nixon when they similarly faced an impeachment vote.  Why is no Republican doing that this time?

 

The explanation may be found in the third factor accounting for the behavior of politicians. It is this one that is perhaps the most telling in the current situation.  Politicians prefer winning over losing and recent history suggests that the way to win, notwithstanding the losses the party suffered in 2018, is to stand with Donald Trump .  By nature politicians are cautious.  The only way to know what will succeed in winning votes is to follow the path of proven winners like Trump.  As long as he appears to be retaining the support of the GOP party base it is prudent to assume that he has figured out the magic sauce in the recipe of political victory and to follow the recipe closely.  Only a few dare to tamper with the ingredients.

 

Change is unlikely in the Republican Party short of a massive defeat.  Only in defeat do politicians, facing years in the wilderness, risk experimenting with new approaches.  Thus far there’s little sign that the party base is fielding second thoughts about Trump.  He remains nearly as popular today among Republicans as he did when he was elected.  Polls show his support among Republicans in states like California and Texas is north of 85 percent.  Nixon’s support, by contrast, began to collapse by the time he faced impeachment.  At the beginning of 1973, before Watergate shook the country, Nixon had the support of 91 percent of GOP voters.  By the end of the year — a year in which John Dean testified about payoffs to the Watergate burglars and Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was fired in the Saturday Night Massacre — Nixon’s support in the GOP had fallen to 54 percent.  

 

So the real question isn’t why members of Congress are remaining staunch Trump supporters, but why the GOP base is.  Many reasons have been offered for this strange phenomenon (strange because Trump is so unlikely an avatar of Republican virtue). They include Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, and the other leading cogs in the propaganda machine that props up the Republican Party.

 

Whatever the cause of Trump’s hold over the GOP base, it’s a fact, and we as a country need to do something about it. We have to hope that the GOP evolves into a better version of itself because, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed in an article in the New York Times in 1950, this country needs two intelligent parties. Right now we’ve got just one.  Only the Democrats are grappling with the real problems the United States faces, among them climate change and inequality.  This is untenable over the long term.

 

Through much of our history we have had a responsible conservative party, as Schlesinger noted in his piece in the Times.  In antebellum America the party of Jefferson was cross-checked by the party of Hamilton and Adams.  In the next generation Jacksonians faced off against Whigs, and while the Whigs eventually disappeared, for decades they offered Americans like Lincoln an intelligent alternative.  In the postbellum period the GOP espoused (for a time)  a bold vision of racial equality and entrepreneurial zeal.  Later it was captured by the plutocrats but by the turn of the 19th century reform elements led by Teddy Roosevelt succeeded in refashioning the party as an engine of reform.  In the 1920s the party once again became beholden to the rich until the Great Depression put an end to its control of the federal government.  For a couple of decades it nearly ceased to exist at the national level.  Then, as if in response to Schlesinger’s call, the party finally made peace with the New Deal under the leadership of Dwight Eisenhower.  “Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance and eliminate labor laws and farm programs,” Ike wrote, “you would not hear of that party again in our political history.”

Under both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan the GOP continued to deal with real world problems, particularly in foreign affairs.  But slowly in the years following the end of the Cold War Republicans gave themselves over increasingly to fake nostrums.  They did this because they found they couldn’t win by running on their real agenda – tax cuts for the wealthy, which constituted nearly the whole of their domestic program once welfare had been reformed in the 1990s.  

 

Trump in 2016 correctly identified several key issues that demand public attention, especially the decline and demoralization of much of rural America.  But rather than offer a rational program to address this and other issues he won election by dividing the country along racial and religious lines.  Instead of appealing to the better angels of our nature he played his voters for fools.  He began his time in the national political spotlight by hinting that Barack Obama was born in a foreign country and might be a secret Muslim.  Later he signed up as a card carrying member of the anti-science brigade of climate change deniers.  Throughout his presidency he’s spread rumors of conspiracies. And his biggest “accomplishment”?  It was giving the wealthy huge tax breaks.

 

What if the GOP doesn’t reinvent itself as a responsible party? Schlesinger worried seven decades ago the GOP could collapse into pieces, leaving “its members prey for fascist-minded demagogues.”  There was, it turns out, another possibility Schlesinger didn’t anticipate.  It’s that the party would hold together by itself appealing to a trinity of fascist evils: xenophobia, racism, and authoritarianism. This should worry all of us.

 

 

 

 

As the Senate impeachment trial of Donald Trump looms, many aspects of the trial are still undetermined. Will the parties call witnesses? How long will it last? How seriously will Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell take it? 

 

One aspect that is determined but often misunderstood is who presides over the trial. As Chief Justice John Roberts, appointed by President George W. Bush in 2005, readies himself for his historic role as the presiding judge over the trial, it is instructive to look back at the experiences of the two prior Chief Justices who presided over the trials of President Andrew Johnson in 1868 and of President Bill Clinton in 1999.

 

Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice from 1864-1873, and William Rehnquist, Chief Justice from 1986-2005, both faced great pressures as presiding judge over the highly partisan impeachment trials. Neither one would be considered noncontroversial in his career, but both had the responsibility to uphold the Constitution at times of great turmoil, and both did so, after an early period of controversy around Salmon P. Chase.

 

Salmon P. Chase’s career reflected the realignment of political parties in the mid nineteenth century. He was a member of the Whig Party in the 1830s, the Liberty Party of the 1840s, the Free Soil Party from 1848-1854, the Republican Party from its founding in 1854 to 1868, and finally, the Democratic Party in the last five years of his life, while still serving as Chief Justice by appointment of Abraham Lincoln.

 

Chase helped recruit former Democratic President Martin Van Buren to run as the Free Soil Presidential candidate in 1848; helped found the Republican Party on the same principles of antislavery activism; sought the Republican nomination for President in 1860 before Lincoln was selected by the Republican National Convention; and he sought the Presidency on the Democratic Party line in 1868 and the Liberal Republican line in 1872 while still serving as Chief Justice.  He had a varied career as Ohio Senator (1849-1855), Governor (1856-1860), and Secretary of the Treasury under Lincoln (1861-1864).

 

Chase attempted to establish the concept of unilateral rulings on procedural matters during the early days of the trial of Andrew Johnson, but he was overruled by the Senate majority, controlled by Radical Republicans, and quickly gave up trying to control the trial. He moved toward neutrality and simple presiding as the trial moved forward after early turmoil.

 

William H. Rehnquist could not have been more different than Salmon P. Chase in his political leanings.  As far “left” as Chase was in his times, Rehnquist was far ‘right”, starting his political career as a legal advisor to Republican Senator Barry Goldwater in his failed campaign for President of the Arizona Senator in 1964.  Rehnquist was appointed Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel in 1969 by President Richard Nixon. 

 

Nixon nominated him for the Supreme Court in late 1971 and he was confirmed and sworn in the first week of 1972. Rehnquist served nearly 34 yearson the Court and was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan. He was regarded as the most conservative member on the Warren Burger Court and was one of the most consistently conservative Justices in modern times. Rehnquist recused himself from participating in the US V. Nixon Case in 1974, where the President was ordered to hand over the Watergate Tapes to the Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, leading to Nixon’s resignation on August  9, 1974.

 

Presiding over the Bill Clinton Impeachment Trial in the Spring of 1999, Rehnquist chose to  limit any attempt to influence the trial that was being promoted by a strong conservative Republican leadership in the House of Representatives, led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde.  Despite his strong conservative credentials, Rehnquist managed always to get along well with his Supreme Court colleagues, and there were no controversies about his handling of the Clinton Impeachment Trial. 

 

He was, despite his right wing credentials and voting record on the Court, seen as fair minded, approachable, and a far more unifying leader of the Court before and after the Clinton Impeachment Trial than Chase was before and after the Andrew Johnson Impeachment Trial.

 

Now, Chief Justice John Roberts, who clerked for Rehnquist in 1980-1981, is faced with the same challenge of presiding over a highly charged impeachment trial.

 

Roberts worked in the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations in the Justice Department and the Office of White House Counsel, then as Principal Deputy Solicitor General,followed by private law practice before his appointment to the DC Court Of Appeals by George W. Bush in 2003.  In 2005, he was nominated to replace the retiring Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, but before hearings could begin on the nomination, Chief Justice Rehnquist died. Roberts was then nominated to replace Rehnquist. 

 

Roberts has been very clear in his desire to run a Court that has the respect and regard of the American people, and while he has a strong conservative judicial philosophy in his 14 plus years on the Court, he has also come across as having a willingness to work with the Supreme Court’s liberal bloc, and is seen as the “swing” vote on the Court since Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy retired in 2018.  

 

He has surprised many liberal commentators with some of his votes, including the preservation of “ObamaCare.” He is seen as comparatively more moderate and conciliatory, and he has been somewhat critical of utterances by President Donald Trump regarding bias of Justices appointed by Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.

 

 It is clear that Roberts wants to have a good historical reputation as only the 17th person to head the Supreme Court, and while he will work to avoid controversy in the upcoming Trump Impeachment Trial, he will wish to preserve respect for the Constitution, democracy, and the rule of law, and will be the center of attention in the coming weeks and months.

 

The Job of the Academic Market by Rebecca S. Wingo Over three years, I dedicated 106.5 workdays to getting a job—while working another job.

 

Prohibition Was a Failed Experiment in Moral Governance by Annika Neklason A repealed amendment and generations of Supreme Court rulings have left the constitutional regulation of private behavior in the past. Will it stay there?

 

History and the Opioid Crisis by Jeremy Milloy In the 1970s, just as now, people living with and recovering from substance use disorders faced prejudice and mistreatment at the hiring stage and in the workplace itself.

 

1619? by Sasha Turner What to the historian is 1619?

 

Boris Johnson Might Break Up the U.K. That’s a Good Thing. by David Edgerton It’s time to let the fantasy of the “British nation” die.

 

The problem with a year of celebrating the 19th Amendment by Andrew Joseph Pegoda Our entire understanding of the history of feminism is skewed.

 

Assassination as Cure: Disease Metaphors and Foreign Policy by Sarah Swedberg Kinzinger’s words fit within a long historical tradition of badly used disease metaphors that often accompany bad outcomes.

 

Another Disability Disaster in the Making by Jonathan M. Stein The Trump administration’s Social Security proposal would repeat one of Ronald Reagan’s most damaging mistakes.

 

How the President Became a Drone Operator by Allegra Harpootlian From Obama to Trump, the Escalation of Drone Warfare

 

 

 

What Australia’s Fires Should Teach the USA: Be Alarmist! by Walter G. Moss Most importantly in this 2020 election year, the Australian tragedy tells us we should vote out all the human-caused climate-change deniers and minimizers.

Trump’s order to kill General Soleimani is one of the most reckless acts taken by a president, who once again has put his personal political interest above the nation’s security. Certainly, Soleimani deserved to meet his bitter fate. He was behind the killing of hundreds of American soldiers in Iraq while threatening and acting against American allies. However, killing him without considering the potentially dire regional repercussions and without a strategy, under the guise of national security concerns, is hard to fathom. Republican members of Congress who praised the assassination of General Soleimani seem to be utterly blinded by their desire to see him eliminated. What will happen next, they seem to have no clue. Trump, who is fighting for his political life, appeared to have cared less about the horrifying consequences as long as he distracts public attention from his political woes. He made the decision to assassinate Soleimani seven months ago, but he gave the order now to serve his own self-interest, especially in this election year where he desperately needs a victory while awaiting an impeachment trial in the Senate. During the Senate briefing on Iran led by Secretaries of State and Defense Pompeo and Esper, and CIA Director Haspel, they produced no evidence that there was an imminent danger of an attack on four American embassies orchestrated by Soleimani, as Trump has claimed. In fact, Esper said openly in a January 12 interview that he saw no evidence. Republican Senator Mike Lee labeled it as “probably the worst briefing I have seen, at least on a military issue…What I found so distressing about the briefing is one of the messages we received from the briefers was, ‘Do not debate, do not discuss the issue of the appropriateness of further military intervention against Iran,’ and that if you do ‘You will be emboldening Iran.’” Now, having failed to produce evidence of imminent danger, the Trump administration claims that the killing of Soleimani was part of a long-term deterrence strategy. The assassination itself has certainly emboldened Iran’s resolve to continue its nefarious activities throughout the region, but even then, the measure Trump has taken to presumably make the US more secure has in fact done the complete opposite. It has created new mounting problems and multiple crises. Trump dangerously escalated the conflict with Iran; severely compromised the US’ geostrategic interest in the Middle East; intensified the Iranian threat against our allies, especially Israel; led Iran to double down in its support of terrorist and Jihadist groups; badly wounded the US’ relations with its European allies; deemed the US untrustworthy by friends and foes; and pushed Iran to annul much of the nuclear deal, all while impressively advancing its anti-ballistic missile technology. And contrary to Trump’s claim that he made the right decision for the sake of American security, 55 percent of voters in a USA Today survey released on January 9th said he made the US less safe. And now we are still at the brink of war. Although Iran has admitted to being behind the attack on the Asad air base in Iraq, it initiated the attack to save face in the eyes of its public and demonstrate its possession of precision missiles and willingness to stand up to the US. This retaliation was expected, but since Iran wants to avoid an all-out war, it was strategic and carefully calculated to inflict the fewest American casualties, if any, to prevent a vicious cycle of retaliatory attacks which could get out of control and lead to a war. This, however, does not suggest that Iran will stop its clandestine proxy operations—employing its well-trained militia in Iraq, Yemen, and Syria to execute new attacks on American and allies’ targets in the region while maintaining deniability. Similarly, the clergy can also pressure hawks in and outside the government to avoid any provocative acts against the US. Iran is patient and will carefully weigh its gains and losses before it takes the next step. Following Iran’s attack on the Asad base, Trump has also shown restraint because he too wants to prevent an all-out war, knowing that even though the US can win it handedly, it will be the costliest victory in blood and treasure and certainly in political capital. The whole mess began when Trump withdrew from the Iran deal. What did Trump think he could accomplish? Withdrawing from the deal without having any substitute, without consultation with the European signatories, and with re-imposing sanctions, especially when Iran was in full compliance with all the deal’s provisions, is dangerously reckless—undermining our national security interests and jeopardizing the security of our allies in the region. The Iran deal was not perfect, but the idea was to build on it, gradually normalize relations with Iran, and prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons altogether as it works to become a constructive member of the community of nations. To resolve the crisis with Iran, the US must demonstrate a clear understanding of the Iranian mindset. Iran is a proud nation with a long and continuing rich history; it has huge natural and human resources, is the leader of the Shiite world, occupies one of the most geostrategic locations in the world, and wants to be respected. The Iranians are not compulsive; they think strategically and are patient, consistent, and determined. The revocation of the Iran deal simply reaffirms Iran’s distrust of the US, from the time the CIA toppled the Mosaddeq government in 1953 to the continuing sanctions, adversarial attitude, and the open call for regime change. Both Khamenei and Trump have their own domestic pressure to contend with and want to avoid war. The Iranian public is becoming increasingly restive. They are back in streets demanding immediate economic relief. Conversely, Trump calculated that further escalation of violent conflict with Iran will erode rather than enhance his political prospects, and would make defeat in November all but certain. West European countries are extremely sensitive to any major escalation of violence, as it would lead to mounting casualties and destruction on all sides. Iran can resort to a wide range of hostile measures, including disrupting oil supplies from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, by mining the Straits of Hormuz through which 21 million barrels per day (21% of global oil consumption) pass, resulting in a massive economic dislocation in the Middle East and Europe in particular. The pause in hostilities offers a golden opportunity to begin a new process of mitigation. Germany, France, and Britain have already engaged the Iranians in an effort to ease the tension between Iran and the US and create conditions conducive to direct US-Iran negotiations. By now, Trump must realize that Iran cannot be bullied and the only way to prevent it from pursuing nuclear weapons is through dialogue. Regardless of how flawed Trump views the Iran deal, it still provides the foundation for a new agreement, as many of its the original provisions remain valid and can be built on it. Other conflicting issues between the two sides, especially Iran’s subversive activities, should be negotiated on a separate track. In some ways, both Iran and the US need to lick their wounds and begin a new chapter, however long and arduous it may be, because war is not and will never be an option.

 

In my last article, I wrote that there is something wholly different about Donald Trump’s actions than those of other presidents who have exceeded their power. Why? Unlike other presidents, Trump’s actions meet each of the requirements that the Framer’s laid out to impeach a president. Ironically, just as impeachment is needed most, the partisan tenor of the times may make it impossible to accomplish.

 

The Framers of the Constitution had included the power of impeachment for instances of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors committed by executive branch officials and the president. They had rejected policy disputes as a basis for impeachment. When George Mason proposed adding maladministration as an impeachable offense, Madison responded that “so vague a term will be equivalent to tenure during pleasure of the Senate.” It was at this point that “high crimes and misdemeanors” were added. While the first two are clear, the third sounds vague to us today. Yet, the Framers had a clear idea of what this meant. As I wrote previously for the History News Network, the Framers “thought that the power of impeachment should be reserved for abuses of power, especially those that involved elections, the role of foreign interference, and actions that place personal interest above the public good” which fall within the definition of high crimes and misdemeanors.  Professor Noah Feldman of Harvard Law School, in his testimony to the House Judiciary Committee, said that for the Framers “the essential definition of high crimes and misdemeanors is the abuse of office” by a president, of using “the power of his office to gain personal advantage.” Trump’s actions with Ukraine checks each of these boxes.

 

Presidents and Congress have often found themselves in conflict, dating back to the earliest days of our Republic. Part of this is inevitable, built into a constitutional system of separation of powers with overlapping functions between the two branches. Only Congress can pass laws, but presidents can veto them. Presidents can negotiate treaties but must obtain the advice and consent of the Senate. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. observed, checks and balances also make our political system subject to inertia. The system only really works “in response to vigorous presidential leadership,” Schlesinger wrote in The Imperial Presidency. But sometimes presidents grasp for powers that fall outside of the normal types of Constitutional disputes. This is where impeachment enters the picture.

 

In the early Republic, disputes between presidents and congress revolved around the veto power. Andrew Jackson was censured by the Senate over his veto of bank legislation and his subsequent removal of federal deposits from the Second Bank of the United States. Jackson’s actions showed a willingness to grab power and to ignore the law and the system of checks and balances when it suited his purposes. While the censure motion passed, it did not have the force of law. It was also unlikely that impeachment would have been successful, since the dispute was over policy. While the president had violated the law, not all illegal acts are impeachable. As Lawrence Tribe and Joshua Matz have noted, “nearly every president has used power in illegal ways.” Impeachment is meant to be limited to those actions, like treason and bribery, “that risk grave injury to the nation.”

 

Congress considered impeaching John Tyler in 1842 over policy disputes for which he too used the veto power. Tyler is sometimes referred to as the accidental president since he assumed the presidency when William Henry Harrison died in office one month after he was sworn in. Tyler had previously been a Democrat and state’s-rights champion who had joined the Whig Party over disagreements with Jackson’s use of presidential power. Yet he preceded to use the powers of the presidency to advance his own policy views, and not those of his newly adopted Whig Party, vetoing major bills favored by the Whigs, which led to an impeachment inquiry. A House Committee led by John Quincy Adams issued a report that found the President had engaged in “offenses of the gravest nature” but did not recommend that Tyler be impeached. 

 

Even Andrew’s Johnson’s impeachment largely revolved around policy disputes, albeit extremely important ones. Johnson was a pro-Union southerner who was selected by Lincoln to aid in his reelection effort in 1864. Johnson was clearly a racist, a member of the lowest rung of southern white society, those that felt their social position was threatened by the advancement of blacks, a view that shaped Johnson’s policies on Reconstruction. While the Civil War ended slavery, it did not end the discussion of race and who can be an American. Johnson, much like Trump, represented those who believed that America was a typical nation, made up of one racial group. “I am for a white man’s government in America,” he said during the war. On the other hand, the Radical Republicans believed that America was essentially a nation dedicated to liberty and equality, and they set out to fulfill the promise of the American Creed for all American men, black as well as white. This was the underlying tension during the period of Reconstruction. “Johnson preferred what he called Restoration to Reconstruction, welcoming the white citizenry in the South back into the Union at the expense of the freed blacks,” Joseph Ellis writes.

 

But Johnson was ultimately impeached on false pretenses, not for his policy disputes with Congress, but due to his violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which some have characterized as an impeachment trap. The act denied the president the power to fire executive branch officials until a Senate confirmed appointment had been made. While the House impeached Johnson, he escaped removal by one vote in the Senate. Johnson’s sin was egregious; he had violated one of the core tenants of the American Creed, that all are created equal. Yet this did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense that warranted the removal of a president. It was a policy dispute, one that went to the core of who we are as Americans, but it was not a high crime or misdemeanor. 

 

It would be over one hundred years before impeachment would be considered again, this time in the case of Richard Nixon. Like Trump, Nixon abused the power of his office to advance his own reelection. Both men shared a sense that the president has unlimited power. Nixon famously told David Frost that “when the president does it, that means its not illegal,” while Trump has claimed that under Article II “I have the right to do whatever I want.  But Nixon, unlike Trump, did not elicit foreign interference in his reelection effort. The two men also shared certain personality traits that led to the problems they experienced in office. As the political scientist James David Barber wrote in his book The Presidential Character, Richard Nixon was an active-negative president, one who had “a persistent problem in managing his aggressive feelings” and who attempted to “achieve and hold power” at any cost. Trump too fits this pattern, sharing with Nixon a predilection toward “singlehanded decision making,” a leader who thrives on conflict. 

 

Indeed, Nixon would likely have gotten away with Watergate except for the tapes that documented in detail his role in covering up the “third rate burglary” that occurred of the Democratic Party headquarters on June 17, 1972. Paranoid about possibly losing another election, Nixon had directed his staff to use “a dirty tricks campaign linked to his reelection bid in 1972,” presidential historian Timothy Naftali has written. When the break in was discovered, Nixon then engaged in a systematic cover-up, going so far as to tell the CIA to get the FBI to back off the investigation of the break in on bogus national security grounds. 

 

Much like Trump, Nixon stonewalled the various investigations into his actions, what Naftali calls “deceptive cooperation.” He had the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, fired in October 1973 in order to conceal the tapes, knowing his presidency was over once they were revealed. In the aftermath of Cox’s firing during the so-called Saturday Night Massacre, Nixon refused to release the tapes to the House’s impeachment inquiry. Instead, he provided a transcript he had personally edited that was highly misleading. The final brick in Nixon’s wall of obstruction was removed when the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in July 1974 that Nixon had to release the tapes, which he complied with. One wonders if Trump would do the same.  

One difference with the Trump case is that there was a degree of bipartisanship during the Nixon impeachment process. By the early summer of 1974, cracks had begun to appear in the Republicans support for Nixon. Unlike today, there were still moderate Republicans who were appalled by Nixon’s actions and had become convinced that the president had engineered a cover-up. Peter Rodino, the Democratic chairman of the House Judiciary, had bent over backwards to appeal to the moderate Republicans and to Southern Democrats, where Nixon was popular. Despite strong pressure from the leadership of the GOP in the House, it was this group that ultimately drew up the articles of impeachment. 

 

Still, a large number of Republicans in the House continued to stick with the president until the tapes were finally released. It was at this point that even die-hard Nixon supporters deserted him when it became apparent that Nixon had been lying all along and had committed a crime. Nixon’s case shows both the importance of bipartisanship in the impeachments process, but also how difficult it is for members of the president’s party to turn on him. In August of 1974, Nixon resigned when confronted by a group of Senators and House members, led by conservative Senator Barry Goldwater.

 

The impeachment of Bill Clinton is the anomaly, since it was not about policy (as in Johnson’s case) or the abuse of power (in Nixon’s case). Rather it emerged in part due to a character flaw. Clinton could not restrain himself when it came to women. 

 

The facts of the case are well known. While president, Clinton had an illicit sexual encounter with Monica Lewinski in the Oval Office. He then proceeded to lie about it, both to the country and also during a deposition in the Paula Jones case, and attempted to cover up the affair. Kenneth Starr, who had been appointed as Independent Counsel to investigate the Whitewater matter, a failed land deal in which the Clinton’s lost money but did not nothing wrong, then turned his investigation to the president’s actions with Lewinski and recommended that the House of Representative consider impeachment proceedings for perjury and obstruction of justice.

 

By this point, Clinton had admitted he had lied to the country and apologized for his actions. The House had the opportunity to censure Clinton, but Tom Delay, one of the Republican leaders, buried that attempt, even in the aftermath of the midterm elections when Democrats gained seats, clearly pointing to public opposition to impeachment of the president, whose approval rating were going up. While the House voted for impeachment largely along partisan lines, the Senate easily acquitted Clinton on a bi-partisan basis. Clinton’s actions, while “indefensible, outrageous, unforgiveable, shameless,” as his own attorney described them, did not rise to the level the Framers’ had established for impeachment. 

 

Clinton’s impeachment in the House was largely a product of partisan politics that were out of control. As Lawrence Tribe and Joshua Matz have written, “starting in the mid-1990’s and continuing through the present, we’ve seen the creeping emergence of a permanent impeachment campaign.” Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama faced impeachment movements during their terms in office over issues that in the past no one would have considered impeachable. During the 2016 election, both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump lobbed accusations that the other would face impeachment if elected. The current toxic political environment raises the issue of whether a bipartisan impeachment effort has any chance at all, especially when the two sides cannot even agree over basic facts. Nancy Pelosi was right to hold off the movement to impeach Trump prior to the Ukrainian matter, but now that we have such a clear abuse of power, what is the alternative? At this moment, when the tool of impeachment is most needed for a president who meets all of the criteria laid out by the Framers, the process itself has become captive to extreme partisanship by the Republicans. 

 

The ball is now in the Senate’s court, where the trial will soon occur. While conviction and removal from office is highly unlikely short of additional corroborating evidence (which Mitch McConnell has been attempting to squelch), perhaps the Senate can find the will to issue a bipartisan censure motion that condemns the president and issues a warning that another similar abuse of power will result in removal. Ultimately, the voters will likely decide Trump’s fate come November. We can only hope they choose correctly.